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Introduction
The closest thing we in the United States have to what the
British and Canadians call devolution is federalism : the
sharing of power between the states and the federal
government.
A U.S. Supreme Court decision in 200 I, Lorillard
Tobacco v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525, sheds some light on the
tensions between the power of the federal government
and the states. The events that led up to the Court's decision
actually began several years ago when the state of
Massachusetts enacted a regulation limiting the advertising
of tobacco products within 1,000 feet of playgrounds,
parks and schools. One might think that a state would have
the authority to pass such a law, but that is not what the
Supreme Court decided.
A federal law already on the books - the Cigarette
Labelling and Advertising Act - prescribed health warnings
that must appear on packaging and advertisements for
cigarettes. The tobacco companies challenged the state law
(Reilly was the Attorney General of Massachusetts), and the
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the federal act preempted the state from imposing any requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to the
advertising or promotion of cigarettes.
In Lorillard, the Court focused on the Supremacy
Clause - Article VI, clause 2 - of the U.S. Constitution, which
commands that the laws of the United States are the
supreme law of the land . But when we look at federal- state
issues, we usually think first of the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution: "Powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Although the Tenth Amendment is probably the clearest
example of federalist principles in the Constitution, it does
not always constrain on federal power. Its authority is tempered by other constitutional principles, including the Commerce Clause (Art.l, Sec.8, cI.3), the Necessary and Proper
Clause (Art.l, Sec.18, cI.18), and as we saw in the Lorillard
case, the Supremacy Clause.
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During the Twentieth Century the Commerce Clause
became the most important source of federal power.
The federal government has power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the various states, including
the channels of commerce (such as roads and railroad
tracks) the instrumentalities of commerce (such as trucks
and trains), and also activities that have a substantial effect
on commerce.
The Necessary and Proper Clause
authorises Congress to make all laws that are necessary and
proper for executing Congress's constitutional powers, and
also those of the executive branch, which includes the
federal administrative agencies.
In this brief article I will take a quick (and concededly,
cursory) tour of 200 years of the evolution of federal-state
relationships in the United States, especially U.S. Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Constitution.

Evolution of federal-state
relationships in the US
Early days and the US Constitution
The story begins in 1788. James Madison, writing in Federalist
Paper Number 45, explains that a strong federal government
is needed to address the historical failures of confederacies,
due to lack of any real central authority. One year later the
U.S. Constitution was ratified. The case of Chisholm v.
Georgia 2 U.S. 419 was heard in 1793. Here the Supreme
Court, over the complaint of the state of Georgia, held that
the federal courts had jurisdiction over suits by a citizen of
one state against another state. But Chisholm did not last
long. In 1798 the Eleventh Amendment was ratified, thereby
preventing suits against a state by citizens of other states or
by foreigners.
The same year also saw the end of the Alien and Sedition
Acts. President John Adams was using these two federal acts
to stifle political opposition. The Sedition Act proscribed
spoken or written criticism of the government, Congress.
or the President. The Alien Enemies Act gave the President
the power to imprison or deport aliens suspected of posing
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a threat to the national government. The Virginia and
Kentucky legislatures considered these acts unconstitutional
and passed resolutions nullifying them . Rather than fight,
Congress thought it politically expedient to let the Acts
expire.

Nineteenth century decisions and
the appointment of John Marshall
In 180 I, Adams appointed John Marshall Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court. In 1803, the "Great Chief Justice," as
Marshall is known, wrote the decision in Marbury v.
Madison (5 U.S. 137). The facts of Marbury are not of
great consequence: the case centred on the refusal of a new
president, Thomas Jefferson, to finalise the appointment of
a federal justice of the peace to the bench. Adams, a
Federalist, had made several appointments late in his term,
including one for William Marbury. Jefferson assumed the
Presidency before the appointment was finalised, and
ordered James Madison, his Secretary of State, not to
deliver the appointment. Marbury sued. What is important
in this case is not the result (Marbury lost), but rather the
Court's decree that it had the power to declare laws
unconstitutional: the power of judicial review rests
ultimately in the hands of the Supreme Court.
We move ahead to 1816 and the case Martin v
Hunter's Lessee 14 U.S. 304. Here the Court still led by
Marshall extended judicial review over state court
judgments, and any state action that involved a question of
federal law.
Three years later, in 1819, the decision in McCulloch v
Maryland 17 U.S. 316 further expanded federal power
under the authority of the Constitution's Necessary and
Proper Clause. The state of Maryland tried to tax the
operations of the Second Bank of the United States, which
was created in 1816 to address the fiscal crises resulting
from the War of 1812. McCuliouch, a cashier at the federal
bank, refused to pay the tax, and the state of Maryland sued.
The Court reasoned that the Necessary and Proper
Clause meant that the federal government could take
whatever actions appropriate to implement its prescribed
powers. Marshall wrote that when the Constitution is silent
as to powers reserved to the states, the Court could assume
that the federal government may exercise its authority. In
affirming the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the
United States, the Court endorsed a strong interpretation
of federal power.
In 1824 Gibbons v Ogden 22 U.S. I was heard. The
state of New York believed that it had exclusive authority to
grant licences to individuals to navigate steamboats from
New York to New Jersey, and granted Aaron Ogden a
licence as part of the monopoly. However, Thomas Gibbons
received a similar licence from Congress to operate a ferry
service along the same route. The Supreme Court, still
under the leadership of Marshall, held that the New York
monopoly directly conflicted with Congress's power to

regulate interstate commerce, and was therefore unconstitutional. Gibbons marked the beginning of the ascendancy
of the Commerce Clause by extending it to intercourse
between states.
We see a resurgence of state power after Marshall died
in 1835, when only one year later, President Andrew
Jackson and Congress let the charter of the Second Bank of
the United States expire. A populist, Jackson supported a
concept called dual-federalism - mutually exclusive spheres
of state and federal power. Jackson believed that exempting
the operations of the federal bank from state taxation
violated the Tenth Amendment, which reserves nondelegated power to the state.
Move forward forty years to 1873 and the
Slaughterhouse Cases (83 U.S. 36) . The Louisiana
legislature passed a law granting a corporation the exclusive
right to operate slaughterhouses in three parishes for
twenty-five years. Butchers in New Orleans argued that the
state violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights, including
the Privilege and Immunities and Due Process clauses. In
holding that Louisiana could regulate slaughterhouses, the
Court wrote that the right of butchers to engage in business
was not a "privilege and immunity" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor property protected by the
Due Process clause. The Court drew a distinction between
federal and state citizenship: the Fourteenth Amendment
did not prevent the state from exercising jurisdiction over
the rights of its citizens, and the privileges of state citizenship
remained under the sole protection of state government.

Early twentieth century and
reassertion of federal authority
Soon after the turn of the Century, the Supreme Court
decided Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45. In 1905 the
Court used the due process clause, under a theory of
fundamental economic rights, to overturn a New York law
that limited the number of hours in a baker's working week.
Although in fact this was a victory for the business sector
over government regulation - in this case regulation by the
state - it was a strong assertion of federal authority through
the Supreme Court's decision-making power. Lochner
began what is called the substantive due process era, during
which the Court struck down various state laws which it
thought interfered with employers' rights to contract with
their employees.
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The Great Depression and
Franklin D. Roosevelt
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We jump over the First World War and the Roaring
Twenties to the Great DepreSSion and the Roosevelt era.
FDR believed that a centralised response was needed to
remedy the depression. The Supreme Court believed otherwise. During Roosevelt's first term, the Court rejected
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several New Deal programs. One such example is the 1935
case, Schecther Poultry Corp. v. United States 295
U.S. 495 where the Court declared the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933 unconstitutional.
Roosevelt's solution was a court packing plan: appoint
new Supreme Court justices whenever a sitting member of
the Court turned seventy years of age and did not retire.
Roosevelt announced his plan in a March 7, 1937 Fireside
Chat. Twenty days later, the Court handed down its decision
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379. The
Court overturned Lochner, and upheld a Washington state
statute establishing a minimum wage for women . Some
people refer to this decision as the "switch in time that saves
nine," the story being that by changing his vote to support
the legislation, Justice Roberts made FOR's Court Packing
legislation unnecessary.
That same year the Court further expanded Congress's
power to regulate commerce in National Labor
Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp
30 I U.S. 57. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Company had fired
ten workers who were union leaders, and then ignored
an order by the National Labor Relations Board to rehire
the workers. Noting that work stoppages would impact
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court upheld the
authority of the NLRB under the Commerce Clause.
Congress, the Court wrote, has authority to enact all
appropriate legislation to protect or advance interstate
commerce.
Judicial endorsement of broad federal authority
continued into the war years. In 1941 the Court upheld a
federal minimum wage law in United States v. Darby 312
U.S. 100. The Court marginalized the Tenth Amendment,
writing that it merely described the obvious; there was no
set limit upon the enumerated powers of Congress. In
overruling a case it decided twenty-two years earlier
Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 25 I that held that
Congress could not exclude the products of child labour
from interstate commerce, in Darby the court held that
prohibiting the shipment interstate of goods produced
under sub-standard labour conditions was indeed within
Congress's authority.

The Lyndon B. Johnson Civil
Rights era
We will skip over the Eisenhower years and jump to the
Johnson Civil Rights era. In Heart of Atlanta Hotel v.
United States 379 U.S. 241, the Court upheld the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and, in particular, provisions that
prohibited racial discrimination in public places, including
public accommodation. Noting that 75% of the hotel 's
business came from out-of-state guests, the Court
concluded that its business clearly affected interstate
commerce. Federal legislation, the Court wrote, would be
upheld under the Commerce Clause if there was any
"rational basis" that explained Congressional action.
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But the liberal 1960's gave way to a more conservative
America, and a more conservative Court. The end of the
Twentieth Century saw a startling break with fifty years of
jurisprudence, especially after Clarence Thomas replaced
Thurgood Marshall on the Court in 1991.
Soon
afterwards, in 1992 the Court ruled in New York v.
United States 505 U.S. 144 that the federal government
may not compel or coerce the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program, here the storage
of radioactive waste.

Resurgence of a more conservative
court with the appointment of
Clarence Thomas
In 1995 United States v Lopez 514 U.S. 549 was heard.
Here, a high school student who carried a concealed
handgun into his school was charged with violating the
federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbade
possessing firearms in a school zone. The Court rejected
the government's argument that possessing guns near
schools was a "commercial activity" that could be regulated
under the Commerce Clause. Lopez was the first case since
1936 in which the Court ruled that Congress had exceeded
its power under the Commerce Clause.
Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898 was another gun
case, decided by the Court in 1997. The federal Brady Act
authorised the Attorney General of the United States to
establish a national system for checking criminal records of
potential gun purchasers. During an interim period, hoWever, state officers were to conduct the background checks.
In an example of the "unfunded mandates" justification used
occaSionally to overturn federal legislation, the Court held
that the federal government may not compel state officers
either to administer or to enforce a federal regulatory
scheme, espeCially without compensation.
If you read Printz you will see the heated debates
among the justices about what they believe to be the
appropriate balance between federal and state power.
Justice Scalia resurrected jackson's dual sovereignty
approach to federal-state issues. The dissenters - Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer - believed that the
federal legislation was a legitimate exercise of federal power
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.
At the turn of the millennium, Congress used both the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments to strike down
federal laws. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 528
U.S. 62 the Court found that although Congress intended to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), and make states liable for violating the ADEA. such
abrogation exceeded Congress' authority under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. One year after Kimel, the
Court ruled in University of Alabama v. Garrett 531
U.S. 356 that the Eleventh Amendment bars employees
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from receiving monetary damages from state employers
who violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Arguably the most controversial of all of these decisions
was Bush v. Gore 521 U.S. 98, the December 2000 case
where the U.S. Supreme Court stayed a decision of the
Florida Supreme Court ordering a recount of presidential
ballots , thereby halting the recount and handing
the presidency to George Bush. The Court essentially told
the Florida Supreme Court that it (Florida) could not have
the final say on how it conducts its elections.

Conclusions
In 1985, Justice O'Conner wrote in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan_Transit Authority 469 U.S.
528 ofthe " battle scene offederalism." In fact, the Court's
decisions seem to reveal not so much a battle over

the relationship between the states and the federal
government, but instead pure politics. Although the tenor
of the Court swings (usually slowly) with changes in societal
norms, and with the men and women who sit in the nine
chairs, in the last dozen years the Court's decisions seem
more transparent than ever before. When the Court
disapproves of the state law, as in the Lorillard tobacco
case, it hoists the Supremacy Clause flag. When it does not
approve of the federal law, as in the Lopez gun free school
zones case, it decrees that Congress exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause, or as in Kimel and Garrett,
points to the Eleventh Amendment.
The result-oriented decisions of the Supreme Court
since the early 1990's make it difficult to predict how the
Court will rule on contests between federal and state
authority. Battles have been waged for more than two
hundred years, and there is no end in sight. Federal-state
relationships in the United States are forever changing and
are, at least for the time being, unpredictable.
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BIALL Conference 2003 - Members enjoying themselves at the
Sweet & Maxwell sponsored Annual Dinner and Presentation of
Awards on a theme of Moulin Rouge
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